Compliance, Mapped to Your Cloud
Assess your AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud environments against the industry frameworks and regulations your auditors expect.

CIS GCP Foundations
The Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmarks are consensus-based, prescriptive configuration baselines for hardening cloud environments against the most common attack vectors.
Controls assessed
#### Description Use corporate login credentials instead of personal accounts, such as Gmail accounts #### Rationale It is recommended fully-managed corporate Google accounts be used for increased visibility, auditing, and controlling access to Cloud Platform resources. Email accounts based outside of the user's organization, such as personal accounts, should not be used for business purposes.
#### Description User managed service accounts should not have user-managed keys. #### Rationale Anyone who has access to the keys will be able to access resources through the service account. GCP-managed keys are used by Cloud Platform services such as App Engine and Compute Engine. These keys cannot be downloaded. Google will keep the keys and automatically rotate them on an approximately weekly basis. User-managed keys are created, downloadable, and managed by users. They expire 10 years from creation. For user-managed keys, the user has to take ownership of key management activities which include: * Key storage * Key distribution * Key revocation * Key rotation * Protecting the keys from unauthorized users * Key recovery Even with key owner precautions, keys can be easily leaked by common development malpractices like checking keys into the source code or leaving them in the Downloads directory, or accidentally leaving them on support blogs/channels. It is recommended to prevent user-managed service account keys.
#### Description A service account is a special Google account that belongs to an application or a VM, instead of to an individual end-user. The application uses the service account to call the service's Google API so that users aren't directly involved. It's recommended not to use admin access for ServiceAccount. #### Rationale Removing \*Admin or \*adminorEditororOwner\` role assignments from service accounts may break functionality that uses impacted service accounts. Required role(s) should be assigned to impacted service accounts in order to restore broken functionalities.
#### Description It is recommended to assign the Service Account User (iam.serviceAccountUser) and Service Account Token Creator (iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator) roles to a user for a specific service account rather than assigning the role to a user at project level. #### Rationale A service account is a special Google account that belongs to an application or a virtual machine (VM), instead of to an individual end-user. Application/VM-Instance uses the service account to call the service's Google API so that users aren't directly involved. In addition to being an identity, a service account is a resource that has IAM policies attached to it. These policies determine who can use the service account. Users with IAM roles to update the App Engine and Compute Engine instances (such as App Engine Deployer or Compute Instance Admin) can effectively run code as the service accounts used to run these instances, and indirectly gain access to all the resources for which the service accounts have access. Similarly, SSH access to a Compute Engine instance may also provide the ability to execute code as that instance/Service account. Based on business needs, there could be multiple user-managed service accounts configured for a project. Granting the iam.serviceAccountUser or iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator roles to a user for a project gives the user access to all service accounts in the project, including service accounts that may be created in the future. This can result in elevation of privileges by using service accounts and corresponding Compute Engine instances. In order to implement least privileges best practices, IAM users should not be assigned the Service Account User or Service Account Token Creator roles at the project level. Instead, these roles should be assigned to a user for a specific service account, giving that user access to the service account. The Service Account User allows a user to bind a service account to a long-running job service, whereas the Service Account Token Creator role allows a user to directly impersonate (or assert) the identity of a service account.
#### Description Service Account keys consist of a key ID (Private\_key\_Id) and Private key, which are used to sign programmatic requests users make to Google cloud services accessible to that particular service account. It is recommended that all Service Account keys are regularly rotated #### Rationale Rotating Service Account keys will reduce the window of opportunity for an access key that is associated with a compromised or terminated account to be used. Service Account keys should be rotated to ensure that data cannot be accessed with an old key that might have been lost, cracked, or stolen. Each service account is associated with a key pair managed by Google Cloud Platform (GCP). It is used for service-to-service authentication within GCP. Google rotates the keys daily. GCP provides the option to create one or more user-managed (also called external key pairs) key pairs for use from outside GCP (for example, for use with Application Default Credentials). When a new key pair is created, the user is required to download the private key (which is not retained by Google). With external keys, users are responsible for keeping the private key secure and other management operations such as key rotation. External keys can be managed by the IAM API, gcloud command-line tool, or the Service Accounts page in the Google Cloud Platform Console. GCP facilitates up to 10 external service account keys per service account to facilitate key rotation.
#### Description It is recommended that the principle of 'Separation of Duties' is enforced while assigning service-account related roles to users. #### Rationale The built-in/predefined IAM role Service Account admin allows the user/identity to create, delete, and manage service account(s). The built-in/predefined IAM role Service Account User allows the user/identity (with adequate privileges on Compute and App Engine) to assign service account(s) to Apps/Compute Instances. Separation of duties is the concept of ensuring that one individual does not have all necessary permissions to be able to complete a malicious action. In Cloud IAM - service accounts, this could be an action such as using a service account to access resources that user should not normally have access to. Separation of duties is a business control typically used in larger organizations, meant to help avoid security or privacy incidents and errors. It is considered best practice. No user should have Service Account Admin and Service Account User roles assigned at the same time.
#### Description It is recommended that the IAM policy on Cloud KMS cryptokeys should restrict anonymous and/or public access. #### Rationale Granting permissions to allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers allows anyone to access the dataset. Such access might not be desirable if sensitive data is stored at the location. In this case, ensure that anonymous and/or public access to a Cloud KMS cryptokey is not allowed.
#### Description Google Cloud Key Management Service stores cryptographic keys in a hierarchical structure designed for useful and elegant access control management. The format for the rotation schedule depends on the client library that is used. For the gcloud command-line tool, the next rotation time must be in ISO or RFC3339 format, and the rotation period must be in the form INTEGER\[UNIT\], where units can be one of seconds (s), minutes (m), hours (h) or days (d). #### Rationale Set a key rotation period and starting time. A key can be created with a specified rotation period, which is the time between when new key versions are generated automatically. A key can also be created with a specified next rotation time. A key is a named object representing a cryptographic key used for a specific purpose. The key material, the actual bits used for encryption, can change over time as new key versions are created. A key is used to protect some corpus of data. A collection of files could be encrypted with the same key and people with decrypt permissions on that key would be able to decrypt those files. Therefore, it's necessary to make sure the rotation period is set to a specific time.
#### Description It is recommended that the principle of 'Separation of Duties' is enforced while assigning KMS related roles to users. #### Rationale The built-in/predefined IAM role Cloud KMS Admin allows the user/identity to create, delete, and manage service account(s). The built-in/predefined IAM role Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter/Decrypter allows the user/identity (with adequate privileges on concerned resources) to encrypt and decrypt data at rest using an encryption key(s). The built-in/predefined IAM role Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter allows the user/identity (with adequate privileges on concerned resources) to encrypt data at rest using an encryption key(s). The built-in/predefined IAM role Cloud KMS CryptoKey Decrypter allows the user/identity (with adequate privileges on concerned resources) to decrypt data at rest using an encryption key(s). Separation of duties is the concept of ensuring that one individual does not have all necessary permissions to be able to complete a malicious action. In Cloud KMS, this could be an action such as using a key to access and decrypt data a user should not normally have access to. Separation of duties is a business control typically used in larger organizations, meant to help avoid security or privacy incidents and errors. It is considered best practice. No user(s) should have Cloud KMS Admin and any of the Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter/Decrypter, Cloud KMS CryptoKey Encrypter, Cloud KMS CryptoKey Decrypter roles assigned at the same time.
#### Description API keys are always at risk because they can be viewed publicly, such as from within a browser, or they can be accessed on a device where the key resides. It is recommended to restrict API keys to use (call) only APIs required by an application #### Rationale Security risks involved in using API-Keys are below: * API keys are simple encrypted strings * API keys do not identify the user or the application making the API request * API keys are typically accessible to clients, making it easy to discover and steal an API key In light of these potential risks, Google recommends using the standard authentication flow instead of API-Keys. However, there are limited cases where API keys are more appropriate. For example, if there is a mobile application that needs to use the Google Cloud Translation API, but doesn't otherwise need a backend server, API keys are the simplest way to authenticate to that API. In order to reduce attack surfaces by providing least privileges, API-Keys can be restricted to use (call) only APIs required by an application.
#### Description It is recommended to rotate API keys every 90 days. #### Rationale Security risks involved in using API-Keys are below: * API keys are simple encrypted strings * API keys do not identify the user or the application making the API request * API keys are typically accessible to clients, making it easy to discover and steal an API key Because of these potential risks, Google recommends using the standard authentication flow instead of API Keys. However, there are limited cases where API keys are more appropriate. For example, if there is a mobile application that needs to use the Google Cloud Translation API, but doesn't otherwise need a backend server, API keys are the simplest way to authenticate to that API. Once a key is stolen, it has no expiration, meaning it may be used indefinitely unless the project owner revokes or regenerates the key. Rotating API keys will reduce the window of opportunity for an access key that is associated with a compromised or terminated account to be used. API keys should be rotated to ensure that data cannot be accessed with an old key that might have been lost, cracked, or stolen.
#### Description When you use Dataproc, cluster and job data is stored on Persistent Disks (PDs) associated with the Compute Engine VMs in your cluster and in a Cloud Storage staging bucket. This PD and bucket data is encrypted using a Google-generated data encryption key (DEK) and key encryption key (KEK). The CMEK feature allows you to create, use, and revoke the key encryption key (KEK). Google still controls the data encryption key (DEK). #### Rationale Cloud services offer the ability to protect data related to those services using encryption keys managed by the customer within Cloud KMS. These encryption keys are called customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK). When you protect data in Google Cloud services with CMEK, the CMEK key is within your control.
#### Description It is recommended that Cloud Audit Logging is configured to track all admin activities and read, write access to user data. #### Rationale Cloud Audit Logging maintains two audit logs for each project, folder, and organization: Admin Activity and Data Access. 1. Admin Activity logs contain log entries for API calls or other administrative actions that modify the configuration or metadata of resources. Admin Activity audit logs are enabled for all services and cannot be configured. 2. Data Access audit logs record API calls that create, modify, or read user-provided data. These are disabled by default and should be enabled. There are three kinds of Data Access audit log information: * * Admin read: Records operations that read metadata or configuration information. Admin Activity audit logs record writes of metadata and configuration information that cannot be disabled. o * Data read: Records operations that read user-provided data. o * Data write: Records operations that write user-provided data. It is recommended to have an effective default audit config configured in such a way that: 1. logtype is set to DATA\_READ (to log user activity tracking) and DATA\_WRITES (to log changes/tampering to user data). 2. audit config is enabled for all the services supported by the Data Access audit logs feature. 3. Logs should be captured for all users, i.e., there are no exempted users in any of the audit config sections. This will ensure overriding the audit config will not contradict the requirement.
#### Description It is recommended to create a sink that will export copies of all the log entries. This can help aggregate logs from multiple projects and export them to a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM). #### Rationale Log entries are held in Cloud Logging. To aggregate logs, export them to a SIEM. To keep them longer, it is recommended to set up a log sink. Exporting involves writing a filter that selects the log entries to export, and choosing a destination in Cloud Storage, BigQuery, or Cloud Pub/Sub. The filter and destination are held in an object called a sink. To ensure all log entries are exported to sinks, ensure that there is no filter configured for a sink. Sinks can be created in projects, organizations, folders, and billing accounts
#### Description In order to prevent unnecessary project ownership assignments to users/service-accounts and further misuses of projects and resources, all roles/Owner assignments should be monitored. Members (users/Service-Accounts) with a role assignment to primitive role roles/Owner are project owners. The project owner has all the privileges on the project the role belongs to. These are summarized below: * All viewer permissions on all GCP Services within the project * Permissions for actions that modify the state of all GCP services within the project * Manage roles and permissions for a project and all resources within the project * Set up billing for a project Granting the owner role to a member (user/Service-Account) will allow that member to modify the Identity and Access Management (IAM) policy. Therefore, grant the owner role only if the member has a legitimate purpose to manage the IAM policy. This is because the project IAM policy contains sensitive access control data. Having a minimal set of users allowed to manage IAM policy will simplify any auditing that may be necessary
#### Description It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for changes to Identity and Access Management (IAM) role creation, deletion and updating activities. #### Rationale Google Cloud IAM provides predefined roles that give granular access to specific Google Cloud Platform resources and prevent unwanted access to other resources. However, to cater to organization-specific needs, Cloud IAM also provides the ability to create custom roles. Project owners and administrators with the Organization Role Administrator role or the IAM Role Administrator role can create custom roles. Monitoring role creation, deletion and updating activities will help in identifying any over-privileged role at early stages.
#### Description It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) Network Firewall rule changes. #### Rationale Monitoring for Create or Update Firewall rule events gives insight to network access changes and may reduce the time it takes to detect suspicious activity
#### Description It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network route changes. #### Rationale Google Cloud Platform (GCP) routes define the paths network traffic takes from a VM instance to another destination. The other destination can be inside the organization VPC network (such as another VM) or outside of it. Every route consists of a destination and a next hop. Traffic whose destination IP is within the destination range is sent to the next hop for delivery. Monitoring changes to route tables will help ensure that all VPC traffic flows through an expected path.
#### Description It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network changes. #### Rationale It is possible to have more than one VPC within a project. In addition, it is also possible to create a peer connection between two VPCs enabling network traffic to route between VPCs. Monitoring changes to a VPC will help ensure VPC traffic flow is not getting impacted
#### Description It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for Cloud Storage Bucket IAM changes. #### Rationale Monitoring changes to cloud storage bucket permissions may reduce the time needed to detect and correct permissions on sensitive cloud storage buckets and objects inside the bucket.
#### Description #### Description It is recommended that a metric filter and alarm be established for SQL instance configuration changes. #### Rationale Monitoring changes to SQL instance configuration changes may reduce the time needed to detect and correct misconfigurations done on the SQL server. Below are a few of the configurable options which may the impact security posture of an SQL instance: * Enable auto backups and high availability: Misconfiguration may adversely impact business continuity, disaster recovery, and high availability * Authorize networks: Misconfiguration may increase exposure to untrusted networks
#### Description Cloud DNS logging records the queries from the name servers within your VPC to Stackdriver. Logged queries can come from Compute Engine VMs, GKE containers, or other GCP resources provisioned within the VPC. #### Rationale Security monitoring and forensics cannot depend solely on IP addresses from VPC flow logs, especially when considering the dynamic IP usage of cloud resources, HTTP virtual host routing, and other technology that can obscure the DNS name used by a client from the IP address. Monitoring of Cloud DNS logs provides visibility to DNS names requested by the clients within the VPC.
#### Description To prevent use of default network, a project should not have a default network. #### Rationale The default network has a preconfigured network configuration and automatically generates the following insecure firewall rules: * default-allow-internal: Allows ingress connections for all protocols and ports among instances in the network. * default-allow-ssh: Allows ingress connections on TCP port 22(SSH) from any source to any instance in the network. * default-allow-rdp: Allows ingress connections on TCP port 3389(RDP) from any source to any instance in the network. * default-allow-icmp: Allows ingress ICMP traffic from any source to any instance in the network. These automatically created firewall rules do not get audit logged and cannot be configured to enable firewall rule logging. Furthermore, the default network is an auto mode network, which means that its subnets use the same predefined range of IP addresses, and as a result, it's not possible to use Cloud VPN or VPC Network Peering with the default network. Based on organization security and networking requirements, the organization should create a new network and delete the default network.
#### Description Cloud Domain Name System (DNS) is a fast, reliable and cost-effective domain name system that powers millions of domains on the internet. Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) in Cloud DNS enables domain owners to take easy steps to protect their domains against DNS hijacking and man-in-the-middle and other attacks. #### Rationale Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) adds security to the DNS protocol by enabling DNS responses to be validated. Having a trustworthy DNS that translates a domain name like www.example.com into its associated IP address is an increasingly important building block of today’s web-based applications. Attackers can hijack this process of domain/IP lookup and redirect users to a malicious site through DNS hijacking and man-inthe-middle attacks. DNSSEC helps mitigate the risk of such attacks by cryptographically signing DNS records. As a result, it prevents attackers from issuing fake DNS responses that may misdirect browsers to nefarious websites.
#### Description GCP Firewall Rules are specific to a VPC Network. Each rule either allows or denies traffic when its conditions are met. Its conditions allow the user to specify the type of traffic, such as ports and protocols, and the source or destination of the traffic, including IP addresses, subnets, and instances Firewall rules are defined at the VPC network level and are specific to the network in which they are defined. The rules themselves cannot be shared among networks. Firewall rules only support IPv4 traffic. When specifying a source for an ingress rule or a destination for an egress rule by address, only an IPv4 address or IPv4 block in CIDR notation can be used. Generic (0.0.0.0/0) incoming traffic from the internet to VPC or VM instance using SSH on Port 22 can be avoided. #### Rationale GCP Firewall Rules within a VPC Network apply to outgoing (egress) traffic from instances and incoming (ingress) traffic to instances in the network. Egress and ingress traffic flows are controlled even if the traffic stays within the network (for example, instance-to-instance communication). For an instance to have outgoing Internet access, the network must have a valid Internet gateway route or custom route whose destination IP is specified. This route simply defines the path to the Internet, to avoid the most general (0.0.0.0/0) destination IP Range specified from the Internet through SSH with the default Port 22. Generic access from the Internet to a specific IP Range needs to be restricted.
#### Description GCP Firewall Rules are specific to a VPC Network. Each rule either allows or denies traffic when its conditions are met. Its conditions allow users to specify the type of traffic, such as ports and protocols, and the source or destination of the traffic, including IP addresses, subnets, and instances Firewall rules are defined at the VPC network level and are specific to the network in which they are defined. The rules themselves cannot be shared among networks. Firewall rules only support IPv4 traffic. When specifying a source for an ingress rule or a destination for an egress rule by address, an IPv4 address or IPv4 block in CIDR notation can be used. Generic (0.0.0.0/0) incoming traffic from the Internet to a VPC or VM instance using RDP on Port 3389 can be avoided. #### Rationale GCP Firewall Rules within a VPC Network. These rules apply to outgoing (egress) traffic from instances and incoming (ingress) traffic to instances in the network. Egress and ingress traffic flows are controlled even if the traffic stays within the network (for example, instance-to-instance communication). For an instance to have outgoing Internet access, the network must have a valid Internet gateway route or custom route whose destination IP is specified. This route simply defines the path to the Internet, to avoid the most general (0.0.0.0/0) destination IP Range specified from the Internet through RDP with the default Port 3389. Generic access from the Internet to a specific IP Range should be restricted.
#### Description Flow Logs is a feature that enables users to capture information about the IP traffic going to and from network interfaces in the organization's VPC Subnets. Once a flow log is created, the user can view and retrieve its data in Stackdriver Logging. It is recommended that Flow Logs be enabled for every business-critical VPC subnet. #### Rationale VPC networks and subnetworks not reserved for internal HTTP(S) load balancing provide logically isolated and secure network partitions where GCP resources can be launched. When Flow Logs are enabled for a subnet, VMs within that subnet start reporting on all Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flows. Each VM samples the TCP and UDP flows it sees, inbound and outbound, whether the flow is to or from another VM, a host in the on-premises datacenter, a Google service, or a host on the Internet. If two GCP VMs are communicating, and both are in subnets that have VPC Flow Logs enabled, both VMs report the flows. Flow Logs supports the following use cases: * Network monitoring * Understanding network usage and optimizing network traffic expenses * Network forensics * Real-time security analysis Flow Logs provide visibility into network traffic for each VM inside the subnet and can be used to detect anomalous traffic or provide insight during security workflows. The Flow Logs must be configured such that all network traffic is logged, the interval of logging is granular to provide detailed information on the connections, no logs are filtered, and metadata to facilitate investigations are included. Note: Subnets reserved for use by internal HTTP(S) load balancers do not support VPC flow logs.
#### Description It is recommended to configure your instance to not use the default Compute Engine service account because it has the Editor role on the project. #### Rationale The default Compute Engine service account has the Editor role on the project, which allows read and write access to most Google Cloud Services. To defend against privilege escalations if your VM is compromised and prevent an attacker from gaining access to all of your project, it is recommended to not use the default Compute Engine service account. Instead, you should create a new service account and assigning only the permissions needed by your instance.
#### Description Enabling OS login binds SSH certificates to IAM users and facilitates effective SSH certificate management. #### Rationale Enabling osLogin ensures that SSH keys used to connect to instances are mapped with IAM users. Revoking access to IAM user will revoke all the SSH keys associated with that particular user. It facilitates centralized and automated SSH key pair management which is useful in handling cases like response to compromised SSH key pairs and/or revocation of external/third-party/Vendor users.
#### Description Interacting with a serial port is often referred to as the serial console, which is similar to using a terminal window, in that input and output is entirely in text mode and there is no graphical interface or mouse support. If you enable the interactive serial console on an instance, clients can attempt to connect to that instance from any IP address. Therefore interactive serial console support should be disabled #### Rationale A virtual machine instance has four virtual serial ports. Interacting with a serial port is similar to using a terminal window, in that input and output is entirely in text mode and there is no graphical interface or mouse support. The instance's operating system, BIOS, and other system-level entities often write output to the serial ports, and can accept input such as commands or answers to prompts. Typically, these system-level entities use the first serial port (port 1) and serial port 1 is often referred to as the serial console. The interactive serial console does not support IP-based access restrictions such as IP whitelists. If you enable the interactive serial console on an instance, clients can attempt to connect to that instance from any IP address. This allows anybody to connect to that instance if they know the correct SSH key, username, project ID, zone, and instance name. Therefore interactive serial console support should be disabled.
#### Description Compute Engine instance cannot forward a packet unless the source IP address of the packet matches the IP address of the instance. Similarly, GCP won't deliver a packet whose destination IP address is different than the IP address of the instance receiving the packet. However, both capabilities are required if you want to use instances to help route packets. Forwarding of data packets should be disabled to prevent data loss or information disclosure. #### Rationale Compute Engine instance cannot forward a packet unless the source IP address of the packet matches the IP address of the instance. Similarly, GCP won't deliver a packet whose destination IP address is different than the IP address of the instance receiving the packet. However, both capabilities are required if you want to use instances to help route packets. To enable this source and destination IP check, disable the canIpForward field, which allows an instance to send and receive packets with non-matching destination or source IPs.
#### Description Customer-Supplied Encryption Keys (CSEK) are a feature in Google Cloud Storage and Google Compute Engine. If you supply your own encryption keys, Google uses your key to protect the Google-generated keys used to encrypt and decrypt your data. By default, Google Compute Engine encrypts all data at rest. Compute Engine handles and manages this encryption for you without any additional actions on your part. However, if you wanted to control and manage this encryption yourself, you can provide your own encryption keys. #### Rationale By default, Google Compute Engine encrypts all data at rest. Compute Engine handles and manages this encryption for you without any additional actions on your part. However, if you wanted to control and manage this encryption yourself, you can provide your own encryption keys. If you provide your own encryption keys, Compute Engine uses your key to protect the Google-generated keys used to encrypt and decrypt your data. Only users who can provide the correct key can use resources protected by a customer-supplied encryption key. Google does not store your keys on its servers and cannot access your protected data unless you provide the key. This also means that if you forget or lose your key, there is no way for Google to recover the key or to recover any data encrypted with the lost key. At least business critical VMs should have VM disks encrypted with CSEK.
#### Description To defend against against advanced threats and ensure that the boot loader and firmware on your VMs are signed and untampered, it is recommended that Compute instances are launched with Shielded VM enabled. #### Rationale Shielded VMs are virtual machines (VMs) on Google Cloud Platform hardened by a set of security controls that help defend against rootkits and bootkits. Shielded VM offers verifiable integrity of your Compute Engine VM instances, so you can be confident your instances haven't been compromised by boot- or kernel-level malware or rootkits. Shielded VM's verifiable integrity is achieved through the use of Secure Boot, virtual trusted platform module (vTPM)-enabled Measured Boot, and integrity monitoring. Shielded VM instances run firmware which is signed and verified using Google's Certificate Authority, ensuring that the instance's firmware is unmodified and establishing the root of trust for Secure Boot. Integrity monitoring helps you understand and make decisions about the state of your VM instances and the Shielded VM vTPM enables Measured Boot by performing the measurements needed to create a known good boot baseline, called the integrity policy baseline. The integrity policy baseline is used for comparison with measurements from subsequent VM boots to determine if anything has changed. Secure Boot helps ensure that the system only runs authentic software by verifying the digital signature of all boot components, and halting the boot process if signature verification fails.
#### Description It is recommended that IAM policy on Cloud Storage bucket does not allows anonymous or public access. #### Rationale Allowing anonymous or public access grants permissions to anyone to access bucket content. Such access might not be desired if you are storing any sensitive data. Hence, ensure that anonymous or public access to a bucket is not allowed.
#### Description It is recommended that uniform bucket-level access is enabled on Cloud Storage buckets. #### Rationale It is recommended to use uniform bucket-level access to unify and simplify how you grant access to your Cloud Storage resources. Cloud Storage offers two systems for granting users permission to access your buckets and objects: Cloud Identity and Access Management (Cloud IAM) and Access Control Lists (ACLs). These systems act in parallel - in order for a user to access a Cloud Storage resource, only one of the systems needs to grant the user permission. Cloud IAM is used throughout Google Cloud and allows you to grant a variety of permissions at the bucket and project levels. ACLs are used only by Cloud Storage and have limited permission options, but they allow you to grant permissions on a per-object basis. In order to support a uniform permissioning system, Cloud Storage has uniform bucketlevel access. Using this feature disables ACLs for all Cloud Storage resources: access to Cloud Storage resources then is granted exclusively through Cloud IAM. Enabling uniform bucket-level access guarantees that if a Storage bucket is not publicly accessible, no object in the bucket is publicly accessible either.
#### Description It is recommended to enforce all incoming connections to SQL database instance to use SSL. #### Rationale SQL database connections if successfully trapped (MITM); can reveal sensitive data like credentials, database queries, query outputs etc. For security, it is recommended to always use SSL encryption when connecting to your instance. This recommendation is applicable for Postgresql, MySql generation 1, MySql generation 2 and SQL Server 2017 instances.
#### Description It is recommended to configure Second Generation Sql instance to use private IPs instead of public IPs. #### Rationale To lower the organization's attack surface, Cloud SQL databases should not have public IPs. Private IPs provide improved network security and lower latency for your application.
#### Description It is recommended to have all SQL database instances set to enable automated backups #### Rationale Backups provide a way to restore a Cloud SQL instance to recover lost data or recover from a problem with that instance. Automated backups need to be set for any instance that contains data that should be protected from loss or damage. This recommendation is applicable for SQL Server, PostgreSql, MySql generation 1 and MySql generation 2 instances.
#### Description It is recommended that the IAM policy on BigQuery datasets does not allow anonymous and/or public access. #### Rationale Granting permissions to allUsers or allAuthenticatedUsers allows anyone to access the dataset. Such access might not be desirable if sensitive data is being stored in the dataset. Therefore, ensure that anonymous and/or public access to a dataset is not allowed.
#### Description BigQuery by default encrypts the data as rest by employing Envelope Encryption using Google managed cryptographic keys. The data is encrypted using the data encryption keys and data encryption keys themselves are further encrypted using key encryption keys. This is seamless and do not require any additional input from the user. However, if you want to have greater control, Customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK) can be used as encryption key management solution for BigQuery Data Sets. If CMEK is used, the CMEK is used to encrypt the data encryption keys instead of using google-managed encryption keys. #### Rationale BigQuery by default encrypts the data as rest by employing Envelope Encryption using Google managed cryptographic keys. This is seamless and does not require any additional input from the user. For greater control over the encryption, customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK) can be used as encryption key management solution for BigQuery tables. The CMEK is used to encrypt the data encryption keys instead of using google-managed encryption keys. BigQuery stores the table and CMEK association and the encryption/decryption is done automatically. Applying the Default Customer-managed keys on BigQuery data sets ensures that all the new tables created in the future will be encrypted using CMEK but existing tables need to be updated to use CMEK individually.
#### Description BigQuery by default encrypts the data as rest by employing Envelope Encryption using Google managed cryptographic keys. The data is encrypted using the data encryption keys and data encryption keys themselves are further encrypted using key encryption keys. This is seamless and do not require any additional input from the user. However, if you want to have greater control, Customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK) can be used as encryption key management solution for BigQuery Data Sets. #### Rationale BigQuery by default encrypts the data as rest by employing Envelope Encryption using Google managed cryptographic keys. This is seamless and does not require any additional input from the user. For greater control over the encryption, customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK) can be used as encryption key management solution for BigQuery Data Sets. Setting a Default Customer-managed encryption key (CMEK) for a data set ensure any tables created in future will use the specified CMEK if none other is provided.
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